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ABSTRACT
Does Decertification Work? Outcome Analysis of the
National Football League’s Negotiated Order (1986-2008)
by
Matthew Bowers
For decades, union membership and activity has been declining in North America; employers have
demanded greater flexibility and have successfully weakened workplace and worker protections.
Modern workers increasingly use alternative strategies to negotiate conditions of employment with
managers who have limited their discretionary power. Negotiated order theory provides a useful
tool for analyzing the mesostructural arrangements of bargaining parties during labor disputes.
This thesis applies negotiated order theory to explore how and why the National Football League
(NFL) players have twice decertified their union and sought court intervention to challenge the
legitimacy of the League’s highly restrictive reserve system. An outcome-focused content analysis
was designed as a preliminary investigation to ascertain why an alternative strategy was sought
and if the strategy proved more effective in securing the players’ preferred ends than conventional
collective bargaining. The NFL case offers a fixed market from which to formulate a negotiation
context of the interorganizational structures and bargaining interactions of its members.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

On March 11, 2011, the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA)
decertified as a union for the second time in its 50-year history. The action came when the
2006 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the National Football League (NFL)
and the NFLPA expired. The two parties failed to reach a new agreement and the owners
chose to employ a lockout against the players as a negotiation strategy.1 Both parties
justified the impasse by accusing the other of failing to bargain in good faith.
The owners argued that the NFLPA never intended to negotiate and always planned
to decertify. The NFLPA contended that the owners preferred a lockout in order to undo
the labor market arrangements established by the expired CBA. The owners used a clause
bargained into the 2006 CBA extension that allowed them to opt-out of the contract in
2008. In a prepared statement, league representatives said that they were “taking the
difficult but necessary step of exercising their right under federal labor law to impose a
lockout of the union.”2
The players’ reaction to the owners’ lockout was to decertify the NFLPA, which
disbands the union and its role as sole bargaining representative of the players in
negotiations with the NFL. This strategy allowed the players to seek advantage through
litigation rather than collective bargaining. Ten players filed suit against the NFL, headed

1

A lockout blocks the players from all NFL operations including salaries, benefits, contract negotiations, player
transactions, off-season training, and access to team facilities and medical care. It is a bargaining tactic used by
employers to prevent employees from working until they accept the employer’s terms.
2
Evans, Simon. 2011. “NFL Announces Lockout of Players.” New York Times, March 12, pp. 18. Retrieved April 28,
2011 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/12/us-nfl-lockout).
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by MVP quarterbacks Tom Brady, Drew Brees, and Peyton Manning. The antitrust lawsuit
attacks the League’s draft policies, salary cap, standard players’ contract, and free agent
restrictions.3
The owners declared the decertification a “sham” and “built on the indisputably
false premise that the NFLPA has stopped being a union and will merely delay the process
of reaching an agreement.”4 DeMaurice Smith, executive director of the NFLPA, countered
that the owners provoked this action. Smith stated, “I would dare any one of you to pull out
any economic indicator that would suggest that the NFL is falling on hard times. For the
last 14 days the NFL has said, ‘trust us.’ But when it came time for verification, they told us
it was none of our business.”5 Smith referred to the owners’ refusal to share financial
information with the NFLPA to justify its claims of lost revenue due to rising player and
stadium operation costs – the owners’ grounds for opting out of the agreement. Normally,
each side would file a petition to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) claiming the
opposition’s failure to bargain in good faith, followed by a bargaining tactic like an owners’
lockout and/or players’ strike. The courts often defer to the NLRB in such disputes and
prefer a collectively bargained solution over judicial interference. The courts presume
that the active parties in negotiation understand the relative issues and context better than
judges in a court room.
An obvious question is why did the NFLPA act so definitively when choosing
decertification as its strategy for negotiation? The owners consistently insisted that they

3

Brady v. NFL, 11-CV-639.
Boren, Cindy. 2011. “Owners React as NFLPA Decertifies.” The Washington Post, March 11. Retrieved May 2,
2011 (http://voices.washingtonpost.com/early-lead/2011/03/owner_react_as_union_dec.html).
5
NFL.com Wire Reports. 2011. “League Locks Out Players as Union Decertifies.” NFL.COM, March 11. Retrieved
April 30, 2011 (http://www.nfl.com/news/story/article/league-locks-out-players-as-union-decertifies).
4
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would not hire replacement players and intended to lockout the players once the contract
expired. In 1987, the league’s national television contracts were not guaranteed if games
were canceled due to a work stoppage. Owners needed to provide a televised product in
order to earn revenue from the television networks. They hired replacements, or “scabs,”
in lieu of the players to maintain operational income and fulfill their contractual
obligations. The willingness to use replacement players increased the owners’ leverage in
negotiations with the striking NFL players. As a consequence, the players’ solidarity
dissolved in two weeks as several marquee players crossed the picket lines. The players
ended the strike without a new agreement and received minimal concessions from the
owners. The 1987 labor dispute illustrates the historical ineffectiveness of the players’
bargaining positions in the NFL labor market.
In the 2011 NFL season, the owners will receive media contract revenue even if no
games are played. The owners will not need the NFL players or replacements to ensure
their short-term profitability. Presumably, the owners’ resistance to NFLPA demands will
continue as long as they can maintain operational income. The owners appear to have
superior leverage in the 2011 CBA negotiations because of their market situation and
available resources. It affords them the ability to withstand a significant work stoppage
and increases their discretionary leverage in the labor dispute. Most NFL players are not
millionaires and need salaries, benefits, training, and access to team facilities to maintain
their status and economic livelihoods. Players do not share the owners’ economic position
and have a limited career life span. Players, more than owners, seek a more timely
resolution to this conflict.
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The current labor conflict stimulates a number of questions. Does decertified
litigation give the players more leverage in the NFL labor market? Does it produce more
preferred outcomes for players? Does this explain why the NFLPA advised the players to
seek litigation so early in the new CBA bargaining period? Because the court system
prefers to delegate rulings to the NLRB and current labor laws encourage collective
bargaining, litigation does not seem expedient. What advantages does decertification, as an
alternative negotiation strategy, offer the players that traditional bargaining does not?
Mere “tactical posturing” by the players seems an unlikely explanation. The action must
serve some other meaningful purpose than to simply stall the bargaining process.
I used these questions as the basis for my thesis research. I wished to understand
the negotiation context that affects employers’ (owners’) relationships with workers
(players). I am specifically interested in the alternative mode of action employed by the
workers in the NFL market to improve their situations. In other industries, traditional
labor market arrangements – even those negotiated by unions – for workers seem
counterproductive to their discretionary needs. If this is true, workers are compelled to
pursue alternative modes of action to bargain successfully with employers. Investigating
the effectiveness of decertification in the NFL labor market helps to understand a structural
framework for the action as a possible alternative for future labor negotiations.
After I review relevant literature and theory in the next chapter, I describe the
methods I used to compare the outcomes of decertification and CBAs in Chapter 3. A
historical narrative in Chapter 4 explains the dynamics and points of contention affecting
the reserve system in the negotiated order produced by the NFL and NFLPA. I also describe
the applicable laws associated with the labor market negotiations and antitrust lawsuits
9

that routinize the strategies of the NFL and NFLPA within a larger social order. In Chapter
5, I analyze the outcomes sought by players through collective bargaining and decertified
antitrust lawsuits. My thesis concludes with a discussion of the importance of
understanding structural conditions that shape the negotiation context in the NFL. I also
explain how my findings relate to other contemporary labor issues.

10

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

As contemporary society differentiates at an exponential rate, social actors
constantly take into account existing social structures and traditional roles to interpret the
meaning of their interactions (Durkheim 1893; Mead 1913; Simmel 1971; Strauss 1978).
The tension between structure and change is explored by many theorists, who differ in how
much influence they assign to social structures versus individuals’ actions. StructuralFunctionalists view society as a system of interrelated parts that are relatively stable and
each part serves a function to preserve the social order. Conflict theorists perceive society
as a system of inequalities, where the normative structures benefit some people at the
expense of others. These social inequalities cause conflict that leads to social change.
Symbolic Interactionists treat reality as a social product that people can alter in their
situated interactions with others.
Sociologists interested in social interaction look beyond biological and cultural
determinants to focus on how meaning is created and maintained by social actors as they
perform in everyday life. This approach is commonly referred to as the “symbolic
interaction” perspective (Blumer 1969). Symbolic interaction rests on three primary
premises: (1) humans act towards things based on the symbolic meaning those things have
for them, (2) meaning arises out of the interaction of individual actors with others, and (3)
actors handle and modify meanings through an interpretive process as they deal with
situations in their environment. The study of these social processes and the freedom of
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action in relation to constraints are fundamental emphases of social interaction theorists
(Fisher and Strauss, 1977).
Anselm Strauss’ developed a theoretical framework for understanding and studying
negotiated orders with a symbolic interaction perspective in Negotiations: Varieties,
Contexts, Processes, and Social Order (1978). He explains how modern societies act as
evolved normative systems that are constantly renegotiated and evaluated against
traditional arrangements. People negotiate traditional values using pre-established tacit
agreements that control what can be discussed, negotiated, and agreed upon.
The NFL is a social order that is negotiated between opposing actors to satisfy their
subjective interests. A social order refers to a set of linked social structures, institutions,
and actions that conserve, maintain, and enforce ways of relating and behaving (Strauss
1978). All social orders are negotiated orders and are human products. They occur within
a social arena and are derived from the self-serving interactions of social actors, where an
actor can be an individual, group, organization, nation-state, etc. The primary actors
involved in the NFL’s social order are team owners and league players who negotiate the
work conditions that affect the NFL’s organizational structures. The owners’ main interests
concern the economic viability of their league and to maintain the status quo that protects
their privileged market positions. Players seek to negotiate the conditions of the status quo
concerning salaries, benefits, job mobility, and security in line with their collective
interests. The sum of all concessions offered by owners to the players as compromise for
maintaining the status quo represents the evolved conditions of the negotiated order
(Strauss 1978).
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There are several components to all negotiated orders. They are patterned social
products with temporal limits. The NFL crafted its organizational structure from Major
League Baseball (MLB) and used the reserve system as the basis for its social order. The
reserve system was an effective mechanism for owners to subordinate players, protect
their interests, and manage the system’s status quo arrangement (Flynn and Gilbert 2001;
Garvey 1979; Leeds and Allmen 2005). As a result, the owners secured monopsony power
over the labor market and controlled players’ demands by limiting what could be
discussed, negotiated, and agreed upon.
As the league’s reserve system evolved, owners marginalized the players by offering
only minor concessions to appease their demands. Despite the small improvements,
players, as subordinate actors, persisted in seeking greater improvements. This reciprocal
give-and-take relationship of actors within a negotiated order is a constant process, which
produces its inherent temporal limits. The status quo is reviewed, reevaluated, and
renegotiated to remain consistent with the changing values of actors. Some negotiations
are terminated as new ones arise to produce better and more efficient status quo
arrangements. The negotiated order at any given moment is the totality of its
organizational structures, rules, policies, and all other agreements, including contracts,
pacts, and accepted arrangements (Strauss 1978). The negotiated order of the NFL, then, is
represented by its constitution and by-laws, which organizes the league’s interactions and
facilitates the conditional standards of the reserve system.
Examining the NFL with a symbolic interactionist and negotiated order perspective
helps us understand how players’ work conditions unfold over time. The sociological
literature on work conditions and their consequences is extensive; for the purposes of this
13

thesis, organizational size, how work is organized, wages, and mobility are especially
relevant issues to explore (see also Hodson and Sullivan 2008). Workers tend to prefer
small corporate organizations to larger ones because of the perception that it increases
workers’ discretion concerning the structural conditions of the work environments. Larger
organizations can produce feelings of alienation, powerlessness, and isolation because
workers lose a meaningful purpose to their association and action (Freeman and Rogers
1999). The corporate culture of these large organizations can limit, and even change, the
choices and behaviors perceived to be available by workers who operate within its
structures (Kunda 1992; Pierce 1993).
Salaries and job mobility also affect workers’ perceptions of their work. Workers’
economic livelihoods are directly related to the pay that is earned from their labor.
Workers use their wages to provide shelter, food, clothing, and other basic essentials to
sustain their lives. Workers’ wages are consistently regarded as a necessary characteristic
of a good job (Freeman and Rogers 1999). Similarly, workers need to feel that hard work
will pay off and be rewarded. The lack of job mobility can disenchant workers from the
labor process and decrease motivation. For a job to be considered fulfilling, workers often
state a need for purposeful tasks and an outlined career path (Hodson and Sullivan 2008).
This is especially true when workers associate their personal self-worth with their level of
career advancement (Ospina 1996). Also, the bureaucratic divisions of labor in modern
labor markets produce a hierarchal pyramid where high-paying jobs are limited and lowpaying jobs are relatively abundant (Gordon 1996). Access to better paying jobs can
become a fierce competition between workers, decreasing the solidarity between them and
their associations.
14

Other variables often discussed as being important to workers in the social
organization of work are job security and fair treatment. Job security is important to
ensure the workers ability to maintain their personal and family’s economic livelihoods. In
capitalists societies like the United States where workers’ healthcare, retirement, and
economic livelihoods are tied directly to employment, the insecurity of losing these
benefits is a source of stress and dissatisfaction (Sennett 1998). Workers feel they receive
fair treatment from employers when they are treated with respect and dignity and have
some discretion in their overall work conditions. Employers who respect workers in their
organizations increase loyalty and relative productivity (Hodson 2001). Workers who are
allowed more autonomy in their labor production are generally more satisfied with their
work than are workers who have their work dictated to them (Adams 2001). Employers
who bully workers to control work conditions can negatively affect the organization’s work
experience, workers’ sense of security and self-worth, and inflict emotional damage
(Ehrenreich 1999).
Job mobility is historically the NFL players’ prominent concern in labor market
negotiations (Garvey 1979; Leeds and Allmen 2005). Job mobility in the NFL is correlated
to the players’ ability to freely move between teams to establish a competitive bidding
market for their services, or “free agency”. Players believe that if they are allowed to sell
their services in an unrestricted free agent market they will increase the standards of their
work and personal lives. Free agency is also used as a promotional apparatus by players
who develop their skills into a desired commodity to obtain a starting position with
another team, choose their work location, or increase their bargaining leverage with
current teams. Research defends the players’ position and shows that restricted players
15

receive lower salaries, benefits, and relative work conditions than they could have achieved
in a competitive market (Garvey 1979; Krautman, Allmen, and Berri 2009; Simmons and
Berri 2009). The players frequently demand the ability to “test the market” with free
agency to receive fair compensation for their services.
Consequently, owners consistently resist free agency and players’ mobility to
protect their interests of maintaining the league’s competitive balance and economic
viability. The commodity produced in professional team sports is “on the field”
competition to sell as entertainment to consumers, or “fans.” A sports league, like the NFL,
needs its teams to remain profitable, stable, and economically viable to provide a
consumable product year after year. Fans associate with a particular team more than the
entire league itself, so maintaining a consistent team base to maximize its relative fan base
is important (Bishop, Finch, and Fromby 1990; Pivovarnik and Zuber 2004). Fans also
desire the league to have unpredictable and competitive games. Winning teams draw more
fan interest, but even teams that win on a routine basis find that fan interest declines
proportionate to the predictability of the outcome (Pivovrnik and Zuber 2004).
Maintaining competitive balance and team viability is difficult for a league without
mechanisms to counteract the inequality apparent between its large market and small
market teams. Larger markets allow more opportunities to increase revenue and
operational income, which provides an intrinsic advantage to acquire better talent due to a
larger budget to allocate on player salaries (Flynn and Gilbert 2001; Vrooman 1995).
Presumably, large market teams could consume all the best available players and
jeopardize the league’s competitive balance and game unpredictability. Sports leagues use
intra-team revenue share programs and restrictions on player mobility to offset the
16

inherent unequal market conditions of its teams so small market teams can remain
competitive.
By far, the largest expense for any team is player costs (Brook and Fenn 2008;
Leeds and Allmen 2005; Vrooman 1995). Players represent roughly 45 to 70 percent of all
operational costs for a particular team. Player costs also represent the biggest risk for
owners. Evaluating player performance is not an exact science and teams routinely draft
high priced talent that fall short of expectations. Team owners also invest in developing
promising players into “on the field” contributors. Because owners expect to recoup a
return on their investment, they seek to restrict player mobility so that players do not
receive training and leave to play for another team (Brunkhorst and Fenn 2010).
Team owners contend that controlling free agent mobility is a necessary and vital
condition to ensure the overall success of the league. The Coase Theorem (Coase 1960)
suggests that whether free agency exists or not has no impact on the distribution of player
talent within a league.6 The only difference lies in who reaps the rewards associated with a
player’s services. If a player owns his rights, he keeps the gains. The opposite is true if a
team owns his rights. The law of diminishing returns suggests that a single owner would
not sign all the best players because it would reduce the value of the investment. The
additional productive output of new players decreases because there is a fixed number of
players who can participate in a game at any given time and a fixed number of specialized
positions. Thus, owners have an incentive to allow talent to be spread across the league. It

6

The Coase Theorem is an economic theory states that the initial allocation of property rights (whether a player
has the right to sell his services to any team or whether the owner holds the rights to a player’s services) doesn’t
matter. As long as the property rights are clearly established and bargaining costs are low, the services will be put
to use by the person or firm that benefits and values them the most.
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doesn’t make economic or strategic sense for a single team to contract all the best players
at any one position.

Negotiated Order Theory: A Closer View
As I noted above, negotiated order theory was developed by Anslem Strauss in the
1970s to conceptualize a general theory of negotiation. If negotiated orders are a
functional element of society, then a theoretical framework needed to be constructed to
understand its dynamic implications. The social order is better understood as a negotiated
order because social actors pursuing competing agendas bargain, compromise, redefine,
and produce and emerging sense of order as a stable, functional, and meaningful reality
(Strauss 1978).
Negotiation is a means of getting things accomplished, making things work, or
amending things so they continue to be functional. Actors enter into negotiations with one
another to reach a settlement over some matter. Negotiation in this relationship has two
primary effects (Strauss 1978: 4). First, it focuses on a specific set of constraints, outcomes,
and referents. Every actor enters into negotiations with demands that it seeks from the
interaction but is often limited by the arrangements of the particular social order within
which it acts. Second, bargaining requires the dominant coalition to assess alternative
constraints, goals, and referents bearing on the given actor’s subjective interests. The
dominant actor is considered one who holds power and coercive influence over the social
order, with a vested interest in its traditional arrangements, and is opposed to change.
Strauss (1978) emphasizes the necessity to comprehend these structural contexts within
which interactions between opposing actors take place in order to grasp the conditions
18

that influence the chosen modes of action. Context here refers to the structural
arrangements of an encompassing order larger than the other unit under focus, which is
interaction. Symbolic interactionists often fail to grasp these larger structural conditions
and have the potential to overstate the framed interactions of social actors.
In order to properly study negotiations, Strauss organized several directives that he
felt were imperative. First, negotiation theorists need to look at a much fuller range of
negotiations (Strauss 1978:11). Previous theorists’ attempts to explain negotiated orders
as a process of social action are inadequate due to the topical focus of their investigations
and specificity. Negotiation is frequently treated as a sub-process of the larger systems but
is rarely viewed as warranting a substantive theory of its own.
Second, negotiated order theorists need to relate the negotiations to the modes of
action available to social actors. If there are alternative courses of action besides
negotiation, then how does that possibility impact the negotiation process? Negotiation
processes are entwined with other social processes that must be studied together to gain a
thorough understanding of the negotiation context. For example, actors in a dominant
position in a social order may choose not to negotiate relevant issues with subordinates
due to the power their positions provide. Corporate managers with monopoly power over
the market do not need to negotiate fairly with employees because it controls the modes of
production, available resources, and distribution networks (Clawson 2003). The United
States’ coal industry is a relevant example.
Third, negotiation theorists need to look at particular negotiations in correlation to
the larger structural conditions within which they operate. Strauss (1978: 99)
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distinguishes “between the larger, structural context and a negotiation context, where the
latter refers specifically to the structural conditions that directly affect the course of the
negotiation itself”. In many social orders, the structural conditions are arranged so that
certain kinds of negotiations are impossible or improbable, while still others are more
frequent and permitted. Workers often experience economic consequences from their
specific industries because the competition and industrial process is exclusive to that
industry (Sullivan 1990). For instance, growth industries can offer better wages, benefits,
incentives, and job security for workers as opposed to industries in decline (Galloway
2005). Workers negotiating better work conditions in a declining industry have less
bargaining leverage than their growth industry counterparts. The structural constraints of
a particular industry can affect how actors view social orders and its arrangements. Actors’
preconceived judgments can limit behaviors and reinforce limitations on the actions that
are open or closed to them within those structures. Thus, for any proper study of
negotiation, both the micro-negotiation context and macro-structural context need to be
analyzed, to comprehend the normative conditions of that environment.
In understanding the structural framework of a particular negotiation researchers
need to examine the structural context as if it were the background and operationalize the
negotiation context in the foreground. “The structural context is larger, more
encompassing, than the negotiation context, but the lines of impact can run either way”
(Strauss 1978: 101). Focusing on both the macro-structural and micro-negotiation
contexts will increase the likelihood that the specific courses of negotiation to be studied
within the larger social structures are identified. Observing the outcomes produced by the
negotiations is vital and can contribute to recognizable patterns of change in the
20

negotiation contexts that may apply to future negotiations and impact the social order
(Strauss 1978). It is the “course” of the parties’ bargaining relationships and
developmental natures that are the most relevant aspects for understanding the
negotiation context and any effective resolutions.
There are many specific kinds of negotiation contexts that pertain to the
interactions between negotiating parties, but there exist several properties that can be
applied to all (Strauss 1978). A researcher needs to understand the number of negotiators,
their experience levels, and whom they represent. It is important to determine if the
negotiations are one-shot, repeated, sequential, serial, multiple, or linked. Also, a
comprehension of the relative balance of power between the negotiating parties is required
to understand their interactions. Knowing the circumstantial power positions of the
negotiators helps to conceptualize the nature of each party’s respective stakes in the
negotiations. Understanding if the interactions are covert or overt is necessary because the
relative visibility of specific actions can greatly influence the behaviors and actions of the
interested parties. A researcher needs to appreciate the number and complexity of related
issues being negotiated to ascertain the effectiveness of the negotiation in producing
preferred ends. Finally, understanding the available options to either party in the
negotiations that could affect their ability and preference to negotiate is a primary concern.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

My research investigates the negotiation strategies employed by players in the NFL
labor market case study using Strauss’s negotiated order theory. The tension between the
team owners’ need for a stable environment to achieve competitive balance and the
players’ insistence on change to acquire free agency informs my research. My main goals
are to understand (1) why players decertify from the NFLPA and (2) whether this action
results in more advantages for players than conventional collective bargaining. Content
analyses of the players’ lawsuits during the decertification period of 1989-1993 and
subsequent CBA extensions of the 1993 agreement provide counterfactual data to make
inferences to these questions.

Understanding the Variables
Examining the differences between class action lawsuits and collective bargaining in
labor markets is difficult because these unique strategies are performed under distinct
normative arrangements. Class action lawsuits deal primarily with antitrust laws and
court litigation. Collective bargaining operates under federal labor laws and uses
gamesmanship tactics to gain leverage in contract negotiations. To overcome this
limitation, I followed Anslem Strauss’s advice. Strauss suggests that the normative
conditions affect the actions of the negotiating parties in 4 ways: (1) aims they pursue, (2)
alternative modes of action, (3) tactics during negotiations, and (4) outcomes (Strauss,
1979).
22

I classify my objects of interest, decertified class action lawsuits and collective
bargaining, as alternative modes of action, or strategies, employed by players to obtain
positive outcomes in the labor market. I treat each strategy as a separate entity and
evaluate the outcomes that each generates within in its own procedural constraints. In this
manner I avoid the bias of holding lawsuits to the same standards as collective bargaining
or vice versa. By focusing on the aims that negotiating parties pursue through each mode
and the outcomes offered by each, I can understand their effects on the current
arrangements of the labor market.
I chose not to examine the tactics used during the negotiations for several reasons.
First, the actual influence of the tactics is hard to determine. Second, because the tactics for
the two modes are distinct, they cannot be adequately compared. Third, the actual tactics
are not essential to my plan to examine the outcomes of the two strategies. Although
specific tactics associated with each mode of action affect the negotiation process and alter
the short-term conditions of the labor arrangements, analyzing them would be more
appropriate for a within-mode rather than a between-mode study. Testing my hypotheses
does not require inspecting these details, only the outcomes of the chosen strategies.
Fourth, tactics employed in each mode are discussed in the historical narrative and provide
contextual understanding of their significance in the NFL labor market. For these reasons,
tactics, as variables to be examined, are excluded from the research in this thesis.

Status Quo
Several time periods could represent the baseline arrangements to compare the
collective bargaining and decertification strategies. I could establish the status quo as the
23

market conditions existing when the NFL officially organized in 1923, using the complete
monopsony structure of an unfettered reserve system. Similarly, I could choose 1970, the
first year of the NFL and AFL merger and the owners’ acceptance of the NFLPA as the sole
bargaining representative of the NFL players. Several significant court cases occurred
during the 1970s that led the NFL and NFLPA to forge commitments to each other with the
original CBAs. However, the litigation in the 1970s did not follow decertification. The
rulings are historically significant and establish precedence, but do not align with the intent
of my research. I view the 1970s-era CBAs in the same fashion. Though relevant to my
discussion, the 1970s CBAs were negotiated under different market conditions and
arrangements than those in the late 1980s, when decertification first occurred. To analyze
how decertification and CBAs affect the labor market, I need to examine the variables
under similar conditions.
For this thesis, I use 1986 as the baseline status quo for the players’ situation in the
NFL labor market. I do this for several reasons:
1. The failure of the 1987 CBA negotiations and players’ strike ended with no official
CBA. Consequently, the league defaulted to the standards of the 1982 CBA. The
1986 NFL labor market conditions are the last year before decertification that the
league operated under a negotiated CBA. Thus, it seems a logical starting point to
measure the outcomes of my variables.
2. The NFLPA decertified in 1989 to seek better bargaining position through litigation
as a direct result of the 1987 CBA negotiations’ failure. The NFLPA was recertified
in 1993. From 1989 to 1993 the union didn’t represent the players because of
decertification. Therefore, 1989 to 1993 represents a measurable time period
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when decertified class action lawsuits were the only mode of action officially used
by players in negotiations.
3. The 1993 CBA has been extended four times: 1996, 1998, 2002, and 2006. Each
extension offers an opportunity to study collective bargaining in the NFL labor
market because the conditions and arrangements operate under the same basic
guidelines offered in the 1993 CBA. Amendments made to each extension of the
1993 CBA are measurable as changes in the status quo and as negotiated outcomes.
4. In 2008, the owners opted out of the 2006 version of the 1993 CBA. This action led
to the 2011 NFLPA decertification after new contract negotiations stalled and the
1993 CBA officially expired. The 1993 CBA and subsequent extensions act as the
only standard arrangements of the NFL labor market after the NFLPA’s first
decertification and prior to its second.

Measuring the Variables
I conducted two separate tests to evaluate the strategies. The first analysis studies
the effects of antitrust lawsuits on the NFL labor market during the decertified time period
between 1989 and 1993. The second analysis examines the effects of collective bargaining
beginning with the 1993 CBA and ending in 2008 when the owners opted out of the CBA.
The 1993 CBA is critical because the agreement is a product of the courtroom litigation that
preceded it from 1989 to 1993. Because the lawsuits impact the negotiations of the 1993
CBA, roughly equivalent market conditions exist for both analyses.
I will measure the outcomes of each strategy as gains or losses in the labor market
situations of players against the status quo. Gains are evaluated as positive increases in
25

players’ work conditions using four categories of analysis: (1) player mobility, (2) league
revenue share to be allocated for players’ salaries and benefits, (3) job security, and (4)
impartial dispute resolution. Mobility concerns a player’s ability to act as a free agent while
entering and playing in the league; free agency would permit players to negotiate contracts
with other teams in a competitive market to seek the highest salary, work conditions,
employment location, and chosen employer. Players’ portion of the league’s revenue share
is regarded as the percentage of the NFL’s gross revenue for a particular season. The
percentage is based on an estimate of the league’s projected earnings for that season and
comprises all monies allocated to players for salaries, prorated bonuses, and benefits.
Benefits in the NFL are viewed as post-career financial plans that address four main
categories: severance pay, annuities, second career plans, and retirement savings plans.
Players and their families are covered by a league-wide insurance plan while in the NFL so
the benefits program is not applied to actual current players. For my research, job security
is interpreted to mean a player’s ability to sign a guaranteed contract, refuse an unwanted
trade, and the minimum requirements to become a vested NFL player in order to receive
full benefits and veteran protections. Impartial dispute resolution deals with a player’s
ability to seek arbitration from a third party that is external to the NFL Commissioner’s
Office in matters concerning labor disputes, discipline, and contract agreements.
Losses are evaluated as negative decreases in the same four categories. When no
changes occur in the labor market conditions as a result of either negotiation strategy, then
the status quo will be considered maintained without a positive or negative effect.
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Class Action Lawsuits
During 1989 to 1993 there were three significant lawsuits filed on behalf of players
against the NFL. Other minor lawsuits were filed, but each case either failed to reach a
ruling or was deferred to one of the three lawsuits examined in this thesis. The three cases
were Powell v. NFL (1989), McNeil v. NFL (1992), and White v. NFL (1993).
I obtained court transcripts for the cases using two sources, the Lexis-Nexis archival
database and LegalFind.com, to examine the individual lawsuits. I examined the transcripts
in three ways. First, I identified the claims of the initial lawsuits for a contextual
understanding of their intents, applicable laws, and which status quo arrangement they
brought into question. Second, I interpreted the court rulings and concluding opinions on
the players’ work conditions using my four categories of study. I marked any changes to
those conditions as a result of the court rulings. In many of the cases, the district court’s
rulings were appealed to a higher court. I investigated these appellate court transcripts in
the same manner as the lower court transcripts to maintain consistency in my research.
Finally, I used the 1993 CBA as a standard to compare the outcomes of the decertification
strategy, examining the changes between the initial status quo of 1986 and the 1993
agreement.

Collective Bargaining
For my investigation into collective bargaining, I began with the 1993 CBA and
included each negotiated extension (1996, 1998, 2002, and 2006). I used the NFLPA
website to obtain copies of the 1993 CBA and each extension agreement
(www.NFLPlayers.com). By examining each CBA, I was able to evaluate outcome changes
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by assessing the standard arrangements existing prior to each bargaining period compared
to the accepted conditions of each extension. Again, I coded the results using the four
categories of players’ work conditions to ascertain any changes to the status quo. In order
to gain a precise understanding of players’ demands entering each bargaining period, I
used relevant news articles, press releases, and scholarly journal publications found online
with Google, Lexis-Nexis archival database, and the NFLPA website. Understanding what
the players sought during each bargaining period allowed me to examine the effectiveness
of the negotiations for players. The sources were not used to interpret opposing
viewpoints of the NFL or NFLPA during negotiations, only the actual demands being sought
by the players at the time of each bargaining period.

Other Sources
Finally, obtaining financial information on the NFL or individual teams is extremely
difficult. All NFL teams except the Green Bay Packers are privately held and are not
obligated to disclose financial records. To verify the accuracy of my collected data,
especially concerning the collective bargaining analysis, I used “The Economics of NFL
Team Ownership” (Murphy and Topel 2009) and Forbes annual reports on the financial
conditions of the NFL from 1996-2008. “The Economics of NFL Team Ownership” was a
report prepared for the NFLPA that was distributed to players during the 2009 Super Bowl.
It examines the NFL owners’ claims that they could not continue to operate under the 2006
amended version of the 1993 CBA. It was prepared for the NFLPA by Dr. Kevin M. Murphy
and Dr. Robert H. Topel, professors of economics at the Booth School of Business at The
University of Chicago. The Forbes data are published in an annual report containing
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information on individual franchise values, revenue, operating income, debt, player
expenses, and gate receipts. The Forbes reports are cited in numerous scholarly journals
and recognized as a reliable source for this information. Prior to 1996, the now defunct
Financial World published the same NFL report before Forbes succeeded it. The Financial
World data, though cited in several journal articles, was not obtainable and was not
considered for the purpose my research. This should not prove to be a major issue because
the Forbes data cover all but the first three years of the collective bargaining period and
began publication the same year of the first CBA extension.
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CHAPTER 4
THE NEGOTIATED ORDER OF THE NFL
Applicable Laws
Sherman Antitrust Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is the most commonly cited grievance in NFL
lawsuits. It was ratified to eliminate unfair competitive advantages obtained by cartels or
monopolies (also known as “trusts”) in the market.7 It focuses upon ensuring fair market
competition and requires the federal government to intervene when violations exist. The
act seeks to eliminate artificial pricing schemes that increase or decrease market values by
restricting trade or supply. The U.S. Supreme Court gave more clarity to the Act’s purpose
in Spectrum Sports, Inc v. McQuillan:8
The purpose of the Sherman Act is not to protect businesses from the working
of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market. The law
directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against
conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.

There are two main sections to the Sherman Act that are most applicable to
antitrust lawsuits. Section 1 prohibits specific means of anticompetitive conduct. It states,
“every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”9
Section 1 violations are considered “per se” violations, which are obvious constraints on
competition and recognized as consistent actions that would always contribute to the
restraint of trade. The court definition is any action that is found to have a “pernicious

7

Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7).
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (U.S.C. 1993).
9
15 U.S.C. § 1.
8

30

effect on competition” and “lacks any redeeming virtue.”10 Thus, any actions that
deliberately create monopoly conditions and serve no purpose other than to cause these
conditions are in violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Section 2 focuses on the end results of market activities that are anticompetitive in
nature. It states, “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony…”11 Section 2 violations fall under the “rule of reason” and are applied in two ways.
First, it must be proved that a possession of monopoly power in the relevant market exits
and survives a “burden of proof” place upon the defendant. Second, the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that monopoly power is deemed not to be developed as a consequence
of a “natural monopoly” created by a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident. The court analyzes if “facts peculiar to the business, the history of the
questionable action, and the reasons why it is implemented,” to assess the restraints on
competition in the relevant product market.12 In essence, if an action appears to have an
anticompetitive effect on the market using logical economic reason, beyond the burden of
proof, then it is considered a trade violation.
The Clayton Act of 1914 extended the provisions of the Sherman Act to specific
actions of misconduct like price discrimination between different purchasers, exclusive
dealing arrangements, and merger acquisitions that substantially reduce market
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Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
11
15 U.S.C. § 2.
12
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylavania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (citing United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U.S. 495, 5 19 (1948)).
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competition as illegal activities.13 The Clayton Act also provided a labor exemption clause
that allowed unions exemption from antitrust liability.14 It allows unions and owners to
enter into agreements that may create monopolistic practices regarding the working
conditions of the workers it represents. Another amendment offered by the Clayton Act
required the trebling of all damages awarded to plaintiffs in antitrust lawsuits.

Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
The non-statutory labor exemption immunizes certain union and employer
agreements from antitrust scrutiny. Under such agreements, actions that would be found
to violate antitrust laws can be permitted if negotiated and accepted in CBAs. The courts
often defer to applicable labor laws that favor collective bargaining to judicial intervention
in labor market disputes. In practice, nearly all management and union agreements
bargained in good faith receive protection from antitrust laws. Antitrust laws become
applicable only when either party has performed an unfair labor practice or when
negotiations reach an impasse. All other matters fall under the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

The National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 established the guidelines by
which collective bargaining relations are determined.15 The main tenet of NLRA is the duty
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Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified U.S.C. §§ 52-53).
Prior to the Theodore Roosevelt administration, the Sherman Act was more commonly used against union
activities in bargaining than corporate trusts. Strikes and boycotts were considered unfair labor practice violations.
15
NLRA (also known as the Wagner Act) of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69).
14

32

to bargain in good faith in an attempt to foster industrial peace between management and
labor. The NLRA demands that all parties should “meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”16
These criteria are considered mandatory subjects of bargaining because they directly
impact workplace conditions.17 The collective bargaining process is based on several
tactics, including aspects employed by either party to exert economic pressures upon the
other during negotiations. These tools of economic pressure are used to gain bargaining
leverage and are considered perfectly legal measures, including lockouts and strikes.18
The NLRA focused upon employers and their common refusal to bargain with
workers in labor market negotiations, constituting an unfair labor practice.19 The act states
that there is only a duty to bargain in good faith and does not define the parameters of
what constitutes a lack of good faith bargaining. Defining a lack of good faith was left to the
NLRB and federal courts. The Supreme Court said the purpose of the act was to provide a
vehicle for the “free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of
employees…and to promote industrial peace”.20
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 provided clearer definition to the concept of “good
faith”, stating that employers and employee organizations must meet and confer with an
open mind and with true intent of reaching an agreement. There is no requirement that the
parties reach an agreement, only that each party attempts to negotiate one. If one party
16

29 U.S.C. §158 (d).
The topics of workplace conditions are more expansive than this and can include retirement benefits, arbitration
mandates, legal liability clauses, internal union matters, etc.
18
In Am. Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310 it was written that “there is nothing in the statute which would
imply that the right to strike ‘carries with it’ the right exclusively to determine the timing and duration of all work
stoppages. Thus, lockouts are legal actions to be used by owners/managers.
19
NLRA, Section 158(a)(5).
20
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-47 (1937).
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can prove that the other has not negotiated with the intent to find a solution, the bargaining
can be declared to have reached an impasse.

History of the Reserve System
As research of the NFL labor market history suggests, the owners have held superior
bargaining leverage and maintained monopsony power over the players by implementing
the reserve system. The reserve system was developed by team owners in closed-door
meetings, without critique of the players, the courts, or Congress (Leeds and Allmen 2005).
It consists of five main elements: (1) the selection of players or “draft”, (2) the retention of
players, (3) discipline and control of players, (4) dispute resolution, and (5) ability to sell
and trade players (Garvey 1979). Each structure is considered by the owners to be a
necessary aspect to maintain a league’s economic viability and guarantee a competitive
product. Though there are five elements to the reserve system only three have major
significance to the labor market: the draft, the retention of players, and control over
discipline and dispute resolution. The ability to sell and trade players coincides with the
mechanisms used for player retention, such as the standard players’ contract, ownership
rights to players’ services, and restrictions on players’ mobility.21 Disciplinary control and
dispute resolution are both organized under the jurisdiction of the NFL Commissioner’s
Office and operate in similar fashions, so they are combined in this study.
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The practice of trading players is accepted in all leagues and allows teams to trade a player to another team at a
moment’s notice without his discretion. The player has no choice but to report to his new team, regardless of the
location or working conditions, or end his participation in the league. The NFL has resisted the exchanging of
players for cash payments that other sports leagues accept. MLB allows player for cash trades because it acts as a
form of revenue share, where small market teams are subsidized by large market teams by consuming higher
salaried player contracts. The NFL views this practice as counterproductive to ensuring competitive balance.
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The reverse order draft is the foundational component to the reserve system
because it allows owners to control the entrance, distribution, and salaries of players into
the league (Garvey 1979). It grants a particular team owner the exclusive rights to
negotiate a contract with a drafted player and the ability to control competitive balance
and minimize salaries from the beginning of a player’s career (Fort and Quirk 1995; Garvey
1979; Leeds and Allmen 2005; Levine and Maravent 2010). The reverse order draft allows
the worst teams the previous season the ability to strengthen their rosters with the best
collegiate talent to become more competitive in the league at a reduced cost.22 According
to the NFL Constitution, in order to gain entrance into the league each player must
participate in the draft process no earlier than three years after graduating from high
school. A player’s initial salary is set at a fixed rate based on the previous year’s signings of
players selected in a similar draft position. For example, quarterback Cam Newton was
viewed as the number one collegiate prospect entering the 2011 Draft. Without a draft,
Newton could negotiate a contract with any team in an open market. He could choose his
team/location and expect a higher salary as each team bids against the other for his
services. Newton was selected with the first overall pick by the Carolina Panthers in the
draft. His initial contract will be based on the parameters established by the first overall
pick of the 2010 draft, and though substantial, will be presumably less than what he could
have received in a competitive market.
The draft was ruled an illegal violation of the Sherman Act in 1976 because it acted
as a group boycott when NFL owners refused to deal with players before the draft or after

22

Evaluating player talent and potential is not a science. A high draft choice is not a guarantee that the player will
be effective in the NFL.
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they were drafted by another team.23 Under the rule of reason, the draft exhibited an
unreasonable restraint of trade that exceeded the legitimate goals of the NFL. The plaintiff,
James “Yazoo” Smith, was awarded $276,000 in trebled damages.24 Despite the court’s
ruling, the draft remained active in the league’s status quo arrangement because it was
bargained into the subsequent CBA. It remains an issue for collective bargaining and must
be accepted into each new CBA or extension by the bargaining parties. The draft has
become a secondary area of negotiations and rarely surfaces as an issue, except in antitrust
lawsuits brought by players against the NFL and the reserve system.
The second structure of the reserve system addresses the retention of players to
specific teams, or “the restriction of free agency”. In the NFL labor market this remains one
of the two main issues negotiated between the owners and players. The restriction of free
agency has evolved from the original reserve clause, then the Rozelle Rule, Plan B free
agency, and eventual salary-capped free agency. The reserve clause was structured into
the standard player’s contract that every player signed as a stipulation to enter into the
league. Once signed, the contract could be terminated by the team at any moment, but a
player was locked into the contract. At the end of the initial contract, typically five seasons,
the players’ team reserved the option to sign the player for an extension. An extension was
for a fixed salary amount, normally 10% less than the original contract in the NFL (Garvey
1979). The team retained the rights to the player’s services, so players realistically did not
23
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Yazoo Smith v. Professional Sports, 593 F.2d 1173 (8 Cir. 1976).
Smith was an All-American player for the Oregon Ducks and was drafted by the Washington Redskins in 1968.
He played one season in the NFL before being severely injured in the final game of the 1969 season. Smith
received an initial salary of $22,000, plus bonuses worth approximately $20,000. To award damages, District Judge
Bryant calculated Smith’s annual “free market salary” from the annual salary received by a free agent at the same
position signed by the Redskins the same year ($54,000). All relevant bonus structures and payments already
received were considered and concluded that Smith was eligible for $92,000 in damages, which is trebled in
accordance to antitrust laws to contrive the full damage amount of $276,000.
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have the option to sign with another club and had no choice but to accept the offer made by
the only team that could employ him (Garvey, 1979). Under the constraints of the reserve
clause and perpetual one year options offered by owners, players often played for the same
team their entire careers. They had little discretion to bargain for higher salaries,
employment conditions, or even their chosen employer.
The NFLPA began negotiating for players in 1956 when players of the Green Bay
Packers and Cleveland Browns formed a union to demand a minimum league wide-salary,
per diem pay for road games, uniforms, and equipment.25 Players also sought injury pay
when they sustained football related injuries and could not play the following season. The
court ruled in Radovich, that the NFL was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny which made a
majority of the reserve system’s anti-competitive behaviors illegal. Fearful of other
lawsuits, the owners granted most of players’ demands including: minimum salaries and
benefits, rank and file pay structure for veterans, and player insurance. Owners refused to
recognize the NFLPA as the players’ bargaining representative.
In 1962, Pete Rozelle became the NFL Commissioner and introduced the
compensation clause as an amendment to the NFL Constitution.26 At the completion of a
player’s initial contract, he could become a free agent and had the option to sign with his
existing team or to negotiate with another team. Any team that signed a free agent player
had to compensate the original team with cash payouts, other players, or draft choices. If
the two teams could not agree upon fair compensation, the commissioner would decree
what was fair. The commissioner’s job was to reduce the free movement of players
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The status quo in 1956 was for players to provide their own uniforms and equipment, including the maintenance
of it, and receive no per diems or salary floor.
26
The compensation clause is generally referred to as the “Rozelle Rule”.
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between teams so the compensation was set unrealistically high to discourage teams from
signing free agents (Garvey, 1979). As a result of the new system, only 34 players changed
teams via free agency over the 15 years that the Rozelle Rule was implemented (Leeds and
Allmen, 2005).
John Mackay of the Baltimore Colts filed a class action suit against the Rozelle Rule
in 1975.27 The courts ruled in the players’ favor and declared the Rozelle Rule to a group
boycott in violation of the Sherman Act. The 8th Circuit Court rejected the owners’ appeal
that the Rozelle Rule was exempt due to the nonstatutory labor exemption but declined to
follow the district court’s ruling. Instead, the court suggested that the two parties were
better suited to ensure their mutual interests than the courts and should negotiate to
resolve the dispute.
After a brief 15-day strike in 1968, the NFLPA effectively negotiated its first CBA,
but concessions were small.28 The CBA was short lived and ended when the NFL merged
with the AFL in 1970. The NFLPA’s CBA was usurped by the agreement between the AFL
players and team owners, which offered fewer concessions.29 As a condition to the reduced
agreement, the NFLPA was recognized as the players’ sole bargaining representative and
successfully petitioned the NLRB for union certification (Levine and Maravent 2010).
The NFLPA contended that many of the bargaining issues should have been
conceded by owners after Radovich, like the elimination of the draft, the option clause,
Rozelle Rule, impartial arbitration, and the waiver system, but to no avail (Garvey 1979).
The NFLPA had accepted the reserve conditions in the 1968 CBA and again in the 1970
27
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Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8 Cir. 1976).
The players received a $1.5 million pension fund, but no increases in the minimum rookie salary of $9,000,
veteran salary floor of $10,000, or independent arbitration, which had been sought.
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NFL/AFL merged CBA and failed to successfully implement the court rulings into a
bargained agreement. As a consequence, the NFLPA struggled to bargain for players’
demands in the 1972 negotiations and the season began without a contractual agreement
and a players’ strike. The owners reacted by performing a lockout of veteran players and
only invited rookies and non-NFL free agents to training camp. After a month, more than
25 percent of all veteran players crossed the picket lines, leaving the union badly split and
underfunded. The only concession the players received was an increase to the players’
pension fund to $19.1 million.
The NFLPA failed to capitalize on the 1970s court rulings as well. The 1977 CBA had
little effect on the reserve system and resulted in a watered down version of the Rozelle
Rule, called Plan B free agency. Under Plan B free agency, teams reserved the rights to 37
players out of a 45-man roster.30 Reserved players were not allowed to be true free agents
and were deemed protected under Rozelle Rule provisions. If a reserved free agent was
offered a contract by another team, the original team was granted the right to first refusal
or to match the offer of the other club. If the original team chose not to match the offer, the
signing club had to provide draft choices as compensation (Leeds and Allmen, 2005; Levine
and Maravent, 2010). Unprotected players were permitted to negotiate with a team of
their choice, which allowed marginal players to secure larger contracts and move freely
between teams while better players remained restricted. Marquee players fared the same
under this system as under the Rozelle Rule, which made it all but impossible for them to
move between teams in a competitive market. The players still lacked the unfettered free
agency they valued and coveted most. On average 125 players per year sought free agency
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Teams protected the most talented players, but released the least skilled players on their rosters.
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from 1977-1988, but only 3 players changed teams; fewer than 50 out of 600 players
received offers from other teams after becoming free agents (Fort and Quirk, 1995).
As the 1982 CBA negotiations approached, players showed increasing signs of
solidarity in an attempt to overcome the stranglehold owners had on the labor market. The
NFLPA changed its focus from free agency to a larger share of the revenue pool generated
by the NFL. The NFLPA sought 55 percent of the league’s total revenue to be allocated to
player salaries and benefits and a compensation plan structured on years of service,
playing time, and individual/team performance (Levine and Maravent 2010). The owners
preferred a performance-based bonus salary structure without seniority considerations
and contended the players already received 48 percent of the revenue share. The NFL’s
long-term financial viability became a focus of the negotiations, though the owners refused
to disclose their financial records. The NFLPA challenged the owners’ refusal to provide
information as an unfair labor practice and inability to bargain in good faith to the NLRB
without success.31 The NLRB stated the NFLPA had “no definitive basis” to warrant a
demand of 55 percent of the revenue share. This decision led to the predictable outcome of
a players’ strike and an owners’ lockout. Owners offered veteran players with at least three
games played into their fourth season “money now” bonuses if a new CBA was signed. By
November, the CBA was signed. The players received their bonuses worth a total of $60
million and realized increases in the salary floor, pension, and preseason pay.
The players elected Gene Upshaw, a former all-pro NFL player, in 1983 to be the
new Executive Director of the NFLPA. As his first action as head of the union, Upshaw
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As a legal statue, a firm only has to open its financial records to a union if it states an inability to pay workers,
not a refusal to pay. Since the NFL never contended that it could not pay the players’ demands, it was under no
obligation by law to share its financial information with the union.
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conducted a league-wide players’ poll to assess the needs and wants of the current players.
Player mobility remained the highest priority (Levine and Maravent 2010). Hearing the
players’ demands, Upshaw made free agency his number one agenda heading into the 1987
negotiations.
Owners immediately rejected the players’ demands stating that free agency would
disrupt the league’s competitive balance and ability to remain economically viable. Owners
prepared for a possible work stoppage by tentatively hiring replacement players at $1,000
per game and secured a $1.5 billion line of credit from banks using their television
contracts as collateral. The NFLPA understood that a strike would be ineffective if owners
were willing to play games using replacement players, but the players ignored the
suggestion and voted to strike. The owners’ strategy significantly limited the NFLPA’s
bargaining leverage because the owners actually increased their teams’ profitability by
preparing to pay replacement players lower wages while reaping the rewards of their
lucrative television contracts.
The strike became contentious, not between players and owners, but between the
players themselves. Two weeks into the strike veteran players began to cross the picket
lines including star players like Steve Largent, Ed “Too Tall” Jones, and Jim Kelly. Players
solidarity broke down and three weeks later the strike ended without a CBA or any new
concessions granted to players.
The NFLPA decided that collective bargaining was a futile effort at that juncture and
reverted to litigation as a way to seek bargaining leverage against the owners. The NFLPA’s
class action lawsuit challenged the league’s Plan B system as a violation of Section 1 of the
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Sherman Act.32 The NFL, on behalf of the owners, filed a motion stating that free agency
was a topic for collective bargaining and was exempt from antitrust scrutiny by the
nonstatutory labor exemption suggested in Mackey. The court ruling favored the owners
declaring that the nonstatutory labor exemption did exempt Plan B free agency because it
had been negotiated into a CBA, even if the agreement had expired. The court deferred to
the NLRB on whether an impasse had been reached. The NFL filed a claim proposing the
NFLPA refusal to bargain in good faith by choosing to litigate. The NLRB declared that an
impasse had been reached and the lawsuit was allowed to continue. On appeal, the courts
agreed to the impasse but refused to issue an injunction believing that such a measure
would undermine the collective bargaining process. As a final decree, the 8th Circuit Court
of Appeals’s majority decision held that the nonstatutory labor exemption did protect the
league and Plan B from antitrust scrutiny. In dissent, Justice Gerald Heaney wrote:
…the majority purports to reject the owners’ argument that the labor exemption in this case
continues indefinitely. The practical effects of the majority’s opinion, however, is just that –
because the labor exemption will continue until the bargaining relationship is terminated
either by the NLRB decertification proceeding or by abandonment of the bargaining rights of
the union.33

Justice Heaney suggested that the players should disband the NFLPA as a union so that the
nonstatutory labor exemption no longer applied. The players chose to follow Justice
Heaney’s advice and voted to decertify the NFLPA as a union and its bargaining
representative on November 3, 1989. This action opened the door for player-initiated class
action lawsuits against the NFL and the reserve system status quo.
The final element of the reserve system that affects the balance of power is the
operative maintenance and administrative authority granted to the commissioner in the
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Id.
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NFL Constitution. The owners feared a Congressional oversight committee would
intervene in league affairs without a demonstrable mechanism to ensure that the players’
and fans’ interests were being served by the NFL. The owners appointed a league
commissioner to fulfill this superficial function and ensure that the owners’ interests were
protected, nurtured, and effectively implemented. Instead of an external regulator, the
owners had an internal agent to oversee the day to day operations of the NFL.
The commissioner has three major duties: (1) protect and promote league interests,
(2) manage labor relations, and (3) act as judiciary control over all league matters (Garvey
1979). For the owners, the most important duty of the commissioner is to ensure the
league’s profitability and sustainable growth. Rozelle worked diligently to create a “league
think” mentality with the owners. Under his plan, large market teams would sacrifice short
term profit goals for the sake of long-term revenue sharing schemes that would ensure
league-wide growth and financial prosperity.34 Rozelle’s successor, Paul Tagliabue,
furthered the group think mentality in the 1980s and 90s with his stadium renovation and
construction program that continued to increase league profits.
The NFL has the most aggressive form of intra-team revenue share in professional
sports. It is the only league that equally shares television contract revenue from the major
networks and cable affiliations. A study in 2005 showed that share of television revenue
fully pays the operational costs of many small market NFL teams, which allows them to
remain viable and produce a competitive product (Conlin and Emerson 2005). The NFL
also has the most egalitarian visitor’s gate receipt policy. Gate receipts include all monies
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derived from game day tickets but does not include stadium concessions, fan club
programs, luxury suites, or parking fees (Leeds and Allmen 2005). The NFL’s shared gate
revenue is split 60/40 for every game, with the home team receiving 60 percent and the
visiting team 40 percent. Comparatively, MLB has two gate receipt policies. The National
League (NL) exchanges at a 90/10 rate and the American League (AL) shares at a rate of
80/20. The NBA and NHL have no gate revenue share policies and the home team receives
the entire take.
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CHAPTER 5
FINDINGS
1986 Status Quo
For my research, I established the status quo of the players’ labor market situation
as the standards that existed in 1986. Using my four criteria of analysis, I determined the
initial status quo as the following: (1) player mobility was controlled under Plan B free
agency and realistically offered players little free agency. The players lacked the ability to
change teams to seek the best work conditions, salaries, or employer. All players entered
the league through the draft and weren’t eligible until three years after their high school
graduating class. (2) The players received 49 percent of the league revenue compensated
in the forms of salaries, bonuses, and personal benefits (Vrooman 2011). In 1986, 87
percent of the players’ share was allocated to salaries and bonuses, while 13 percent was
used to cover retirement benefits. The median average player salary was $198,000,
including prorated bonuses. (3) Job security was relatively weak. Only 3 percent of players
in the entire league had guaranteed salaries for the 1986 season (Hachlin 2008). A
majority of those players were on the teams’ practice squads and only 11 active roster
players had a guaranteed salary. Players had no discretion or recourse if a team traded
them. The owner retained complete control over the rights to a player under contract and
could trade him without warning or justification. Players became vested in the NFL after
six full seasons on an NFL roster, or 96 games at 16 games per season. If injured during the
course of a season, players were said to have played a full credited season if they were on
the active roster for eight games over the course of the season. (4) Due to statutes in the
standard player’s contract, a player forgoes any right to an external arbitrator and allows
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the NFL Commissioner to act as judge and jury over all league matters. If a player had a
grievance with a team or condition of employment or sought to appeal a disciplinary action
taken by a team or the league against him, he could not express his complaints to an
outside arbitrator. All conflicts were presented before the commissioner for resolution.
Also, the commissioner retained veto power over all player contracts to ensure that they
complied with league standards.

Decertification Period (1989-1993)
All three of the lawsuits studied in my research directly addressed the NFL’s
restraints on players’ mobility as they enter and play in the league. The Powell lawsuit was
filed before decertification was recognized and was judged on the precedent of earlier
court rulings where the courts ruled that “the labor exemption would continue to shield the
existing system of player restraints until the parties reach an impasse in negotiations.”35
The courts wrote that, “defendants (owners) were protected from plaintiffs’ (players’)
antitrust allegations up until the point of impasse and since impasse was not found until
June 17, 1988, plaintiffs’ claims for antitrust damages regarding the right of first
refusal/compensation system before that date are without merit.”36
In McNeil v. NFL, eight players directly attacked the Plan B system of free agency as
an unreasonable restraint on trade that affected their ability to earn top salaries compared
with players in other professional sports. The jurors sided with the players on three of four
issues: (1) Plan B had a “harmful effect” on competition, (2) Plan B was more restrictive
than it needed to be, (3) and players suffered economic injury due to Plan B free agency.
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Plan B free agency was ruled to be a violation of antitrust laws and, thus, an illegal restraint
of trade in a competitive market. The owners succeeded on how much Plan B contributed
to competitive balance in the NFL and the inherent need to maintain competitive balance in
a sports industry.
In McNeil, the courts recognized the decertification of the NFLPA and ended the
owners’ antitrust protection from antitrust lawsuits provided by the nonstatutory labor
exemption. The court referred to rulings in Powell and Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, which
declared that the termination of the collective bargaining relationship did not establish a
“new principle of law” because decertification is a common practice with legal
precedents.37 The court continued that the dissenting opinions in Powell foreshadowed
the current arrangements of the McNeil case. Although the majority in Powell declined to
pick the exact point at which the labor exemption would end, they acknowledged that the
bargaining relationship could be terminated and thus the owners’ protections.
The defendants contended that the 8th Circuit’s opinion in Powell did not address the
issue of what actions would be legally sufficient to terminate the labor exemption. In
response, the court observed that “generally the collective bargaining relationship between
an employer and a particular union exists for as long as that union continues to be the
recognized bargaining representative of a majority of the employees.”38 The court wrote
that labor law protects the voluntary nature of union representation and stated, “the NLRA
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guarantees the employees the right to bargain collectively with representatives of their
own choosing.”39
The defendants countered that the final factor in Chevron, concerning the balance of
equities, favored the plaintiffs because they relied solely on the decision in Powell and
failed to seek a prompt determination of the labor exemption issue. The defendants argued
the plaintiffs had an unfair advantage in the McNeil case because of “the 8th Circuit’s holding
that the right of first refusal/compensation system portion of Plan B was immune from
antitrust scrutiny until this Court specified the point in time when the exemption
expired.”40 The court rejected this claim on the basis that the defendants were clearly put
on notice that they were not entitled to a permanent immunity from antitrust scrutiny. The
court continued, “the players took a drastic step ending their union representation to allow
individual claims to go forward and have already paid a significant price for the loss of that
representation.”41
After the legal wrangling concluded, the courts denied the defendants’ motion for
partial summary judgment of the plaintiffs’ claims, with three significant issues that
required attention. First, there is a relevant market for the services of professional football
players in the United States. Second, there is a relevant market for professional football in
the United States. Third, the NFL defendants possess monopoly power in each of those
relevant markets. The final point reaffirms the court findings in USFL v. NFL that the
owners had willfully monopolized the market.42 The owners defended that AFL v. NFL was
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inconsistent with USFL and survived appeal on the basis that NFL defendants did not
possess monopoly power in the relevant market.43 The McNeil court ruled the AFL case
was distinguishable from the current arrangements of the labor market and 30 years
outdated. On appeal, the defendants contended that the acquisition of the AFL was a
strategic business action that naturally led to the monopolized market. The plaintiffs
countered, using 2nd Circuit notes in USFL, “in 1966, the NFL and AFL agreed to merge,
largely because the competition for players had sharply increased salaries. Congress
exempted this merger from antitrust laws by legislation and not judicial ruling…” 44 The 2nd
Circuit Court ruled in McNeil that the issue of monopoly power is relevant to the inquiry of
whether the challenged restraints are anticompetitive under the rule of reason. The 2nd
Circuit continued:
Defendants argue that monopolization of an output product market, that
is the market of professional football, is irrelevant to a determination of the
legality of restraints in an input labor market, that is the market for professional
football player services. They nevertheless premise their entire rule of reason
defense on the alleged necessity of implementing player restraints in the
relevant input market in order to strengthen their ability to compete in the
output market.

The USFL jury verdict thus became a tested precedent for the McNeil case. Unlike the
situation in 1992, the court noted that a rival league existed at the time of the USFL case.
The jury had found that the NFL had monopoly powers in USFL, a situation less compelling
than the current market arrangements. The jury in McNeil ruled that Plan B restraints
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and inflicted economic injury on the plaintiffs. The
McNeil verdict precluded the owners from re-litigating the existence of their monopoly
power in the relevant market of professional football.

43
44

AFL v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. 60, 323 F. 2d 124 (4 Cir. 1963).
USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d at 1344.

49

The McNeil case is monumental because it eliminated the NFL’s nonstatutory
protection from antitrust scrutiny and owners’ monopsony control over free agency. It
validated the Radovich and 1970s court rulings against the reserve system and opened the
door for future lawsuits by NFL players. McNeil paved the way for players to obtain an
improved free agent system.
After the McNeil case, several lawsuits were filed by players seeking antitrust
injunctions and damages stemming from various reserve system practices like Plan B free
agency, the standard players’ contract, and the draft. In Jackson v. NFL players said the
same injuries ruled in McNeil affected and restrained them from becoming free agents.45
The court granted a temporary restraining order against the NFL and Plan B free agency,
stating “the players would suffer irreparable injury each week they remained restricted
under the NFL-imposed system of player restraints.”46
Shortly after Jackson, Reggie White and four other players demanded total or
modified free agency for all current or future players, not merely individual players named
in the lawsuit.47 It stated that the lawsuit was brought on behalf of:
(i)
(ii)

all players who have been, are now, or will be under contract to play
professional football for an NFL club at any time from August 31, 1987,
to the date of final judgment and …
all college and other football players who, as of August 31, 1987, to the
date of final judgment have been, are now, or will be eligible to play
football as a rookie for an NFL team.

This action of solidarity marked the first time the players explicitly expressed interest to be
recognized as a collective in any particular lawsuit. In response, the court certified a
settlement class for damages and injunctions.
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The owners did not like the pattern of the court decisions and feared the White case
would follow form and would decrease the owners’ ability to restrain players within the
league. Rather than chance another defeat in court, the owners offered to settle with the
players and conceded a new free agent system. The plaintiffs in White agreed to settle the
case and all other ongoing litigation related to the labor dispute. The Minnesota District
Court mediated the settlement process and granted a preliminary approval of the
agreement. Any interested party in the settlement was allowed to present grievances
before the court for several weeks. The court overruled the few objections and enjoined
every individual lawsuit by NFL players with similar claims into a class group. The
agreement, known as the “White Settlement Agreement,” had several significant
elements.48 First, it granted all NFL players unrestricted free agency after completing the
terms of their initial contract, which for most players came after their fourth season in the
league. As a condition to the agreement, only players who were actively litigating a similar
claim at the time of White were allowed free agency in 1993. All other players had to wait
until the 1994 season to become free agents. Second, as a compromise to free agency, the
players agreed to a salary cap that was derived from a percentage of the League’s defined
gross revenue (DGR).49 The exact percentage of the initial salary cap was considered an
issue for collective bargaining. Therefore, the 1993 season was played without a salary cap
in order to bargain a proper level for the 1994 season. As a part of the settlement
negotiations, owners approved a salary floor to coincide with the salary cap. Each team

48

White v. NFL, 836 F. Supp. 1508 (D. Minn. 1993).
Defined gross revenue is derived from the total shared revenue between NFL teams, mostly generated from
national contracts, licensing agreements, and visitor portion of gate receipts.
49

51

was required to pay a minimum amount each year for player salaries. The salary floor was
established as 85 percent of a particular season’s salary cap amount.
The players agreed to recertify the NFLPA as a third condition of the White
agreement. This caused tension with many players, including NFLPA Executive Director
Gene Upshaw who stated, “we didn’t plan to recertify the union, it was the owners who
requested it.”50 The last major part of the settlement dictated that any amendment to the
agreement must be approved by the Minnesota District Court’s Judge William Doty. The
NFL and NFLPA agreed to give Judge Doty control over dispute resolution and final consent
judgment over the league’s labor agreements.
After receiving free agency in the settlement, veteran players grew less concerned
with labor issues that affected future players. As a consequence, the draft and standard
players’ contract remained active elements of the NFL labor arrangement to be bargained
over in upcoming negotiations. One week after the White settlement the recertified NFLPA
and NFL offered a new CBA to the district court for approval. The CBA mirrored the
settlement agreement and was successfully approved by the district court on April 30th,
1993.

Collective Bargaining Period (1993 – 2008)
The 1993 CBA brought a new era to the NFL and redefined the status quo
arrangements of the labor market. The players had successfully won free agency through
litigation and began to test the open market. Owners sought to salvage the reserve system
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and looked for new strategies to control player mobility, maintain the league’s competitive
balance, and maximize profits.

Player Mobility
The 1993 CBA did not change the NFL’s draft process as a means to control the
entrance of new talent into the league. The draft expires at the end of each extension and
remains a relevant topic for collective bargaining. In order for the draft to remain active, it
must be accepted by the NFLPA during each bargaining period. From 1993-2008, the
traditional arrangements of the draft did not change.
Veteran players did not receive improved conditions during the life of the 1993 CBA
either. The agreement allowed veteran players to become free agents after four seasons in
the league and did not change during the bargaining period. The only exception came in
2008 when the owners opted out of the 2006 extension. According to the 2006 CBA, if the
owners chose to opt out of the agreement, then, starting in 2010, a player would become an
unrestricted free agent after six seasons.51 The 2010 season was played under this new
arrangement, and it remains the status quo until a new CBA can be negotiated.

Revenue Share
The owners’ revenue share offered to players as stipulated in the 1993 CBA is
derived from a percentage of the League’s DGR. The percentage represents an estimation
of the League’s projected revenue for the upcoming season. The salary cap is established
by quantifying a dollar amount from the percentage of DGR, subtracting player benefit
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costs, and dividing by the number of teams in the league. In 1994, the percentage of DGR
allocated to player costs was 59.3 percent.52 This translated into a players’ revenue share
of $1.079 billion and created the first NFL salary cap at $33,718,750. As a result of the
salary cap, the mean players’ salary decreased from $660,000 in 1993 to $628,000.
The 1993 season had no salary cap and marked the first season of free agency for
certain players. The revenue share received by players in 1993 was a drastic increase from
previous seasons. From 1990 to 1992 the average revenue share received by players was
55.3 percent (Vrooman, 2011). In 1993, the players’ share was 68.5 percent. This share
was responsible for a 38 percent increase in player salaries. In 1994, the salary cap was
established and the revenue share decreased to 59.3 percent.53 It decreased again in 1995
to 56.9 percent heading into the 1996 bargaining period.
The first three seasons of the 1996 CBA show a recognizable pattern to the
owner/player revenue sharing system. At the beginning of each extension, the revenue
share is at its peak before depreciating over the length of the agreement. This pattern is
caused by the strategic positioning of the league’s television contracts. The owners
brokered the television contracts to expire the same year as each extension. A significant
portion of the salary cap was associated with the television contracts’ ratio to the DGR, so
changes in the television contracts had a causal effect on the revenue share. Following the
previous example, the 1996 extension to the CBA saw the revenue share increase to 61.4
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percent. In the three subsequent years of the 1996 extension, the players’ revenue share
decreased to 58.9, 56.4, and 55.9 percent, respectively.54
The television contract negotiations became a point of contention during the 2002
CBA negotiations because the NFLPA was not included in the bargaining sessions between
the NFL and television networks (Halchin 2008). The NFLPA filed an unfair labor practice
with the NLRB, but the motion was denied a hearing. The NLRB cited a lack of sufficient
claim to justify the need to be present at the contract negotiations. The NFLPA remained
excluded until the 2006 CBA extension. The owners offered the NFLPA a larger revenue
share as a compromise to this conflict. The years 2002-2005 mark the only time period the
players’ revenue share increased over the course of the agreement rising from 61.5 percent
in 2002 to 63.5 percent in 2005.55 The 2005 revenue share was the highest percentage
received by players since the 1993 season.
The 2006 CBA made the most significant changes to the NFL’s revenue share
arrangements. Before the bargaining period started, the owners were in conflict with each
other over the League revenue share between teams, not players. The stadium initiative of
the 1990s created a situation where teams with newer stadiums were enjoying large profit
margins due to unshared revenue. Newer stadiums offered more luxury boxes, expensive
club seating, and personal seat licenses (PSL) that generated exclusive revenue for a
team.56 Owners who operated in outdated stadiums received diminishing returns
compared to owners in newer stadiums.
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The NFL offered a solution for the owners to be negotiated in the 2006 CBA. In
order to balance the league revenue share between teams, the owners agreed to broaden
the scope of the DGR to include total revenue (TR).57 In the past, the DGR was established
primarily from the national television contracts, licensing agreements, and visitor gate
receipts. The new TR system contained all team income including luxury boxes, club
seating, PSLs, and game day parking fees. As a compromise to the new arrangement, the
NFLPA agreed to reduce the players’ share of the TR to 57.0 percent, instead of 64.5
percent under the DGR system. The players received a smaller percentage of a larger pie
and the salary cap rose from $94.5 million (DGR) to $102 million (TR) per club. A
stipulation to the new system was an owners’ deduction of various operation expenses
before the players’ revenue share calculation. The credit deductions helped owners offset
the cost of new stadium financing, luxury box and club seating depreciation, and increased
operational expenses of the larger stadiums. The owners bargained the more expensive
stadiums increased the revenue share for all parties. The NFLPA accepted the terms on the
condition the owners would include them in all future contract and licensing negotiations
with external sponsors and agencies.
The three seasons affected by the 2006 CBA before the owners opted out of the
agreement in 2008 saw a substantial growth in player salaries but not in the percentage of
revenue share. The revenue share for the seasons 2006-2008 was calculated at 57.0, 57.0,
and 57.5 percent, respectively.58 The mean average players’ salary rose 20 percent in

one-time payment or a yearly due. A fan is not refunded the PSL fee if they stop purchasing season tickets, but
he/she can sell the PSL ownership rights to another fan.
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2006, 8 percent in 2007, and 13 percent in 2008 to reach $1.94 million dollars (see Table
1).
Table 1: NFL Total Revenue and Percentage of Players’ Share
Total Revenue¹
1986

859

National
Revenue %²
NA

Player %³

Mean Salary⁴

1993

1,745

75.2

68.5

666

37.7

1994

1,819

70.3

59.3

628

-5.7

1995

2,142

67.2

56.9

717

14.1

1996

2,235

65.9

61.4

788

9.9

1997

2,382

64.3

58.9

737

-6.5

1998

3,138

69.4

56.4

993

34.7

1999

3,423

67.2

55.9

1056

6.4

2000

3,938

63.5

61.7

1116

5.7

2001

4,284

63.4

57.1

1101

-1.4

2002

4,944

59.9

61.5

1316

19.6

2003

5,330

60.0

62.6

1209

-4.3

2004

6,029

58.8

63.1

1331

5.7

2005

6,160

59.9

63.5

1396

4.9

2006

6,539

61.1

57

1687

20.8

2007

7,090

61.2

57

1712

1.5

2008

7,575

62.1

57.5

1947

13.7

49

198

3.8

Total revenue (TR) in millions of U.S. dollars (Forbes).
2 Percentage of TR that is attributed to national television contracts (Forbes; Murphy and Topel 2009).
3 Players share of the NFL revenue.
4 Mean salary of NFL players in thousands of U.S. dollars (Forbes)
5 Percentage change of NFL players’ mean salary year over year
1
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% Change⁵

Benefits
Benefits are funded from a portion of the League’s total revenue that is allocated to
players. In 1987, benefits represented 10 percent of the players’ revenue share,
supporting both active and retired players (Halchin 2008). Under the 1993 CBA, benefits
are defined as “the aggregate for a League Year of all sums paid…by the NFL and all NFL
teams for, to, or on behalf of present or former NFL players, but only for (i) pension
funding, (ii) group insurance, (iii) injury protection, (iv) workers’ compensation, (v) preseason per diem, (vi) travel expenses, (vii) postseason pay, (viii) player medical costs, (ix)
tuition assistance, and (x) players’ health reimbursement account.”59
The NFLPA has a persistent conflict between active and retired players concerning
benefits that is similar to the owners’ issues with team revenue share. All monies
designated for the retired players’ benefit programs are apportioned from each season’s
revenue share allocated to current players. Current players sacrifice a percentage of each
season’s monies to facilitate the needs of all retired players. The NFLPA only represents
current NFL players during negotiations, so the monies provided to retired players is at the
discretion of the represented players. For this reason, the NFLPA constantly seeks more
benefit concessions from the owners in order to offset the tax on current players by retired
players.
The 1993 CBA established many new benefit programs for active and retired
players. Players became vested after five credited seasons and earned a benefit credit for
each year played.60 The benefit credit was established at a rate of $80 a month for each
credited season. A retired vested player was eligible to receive pension benefits at age 55,
59
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or 20 years after retiring from the league, whichever came later. The 1993 CBA allowed
players who were one credited season shy of vestment, eligibility to receive a lump sum
payment at the current rate of pension compensation for years played in the league. The
Retiree Medical Plan afforded retired players access to the active players’ group insurance
benefits.61 Previously, retired players who were vested in the league received full benefits
for 48 months and a 50 percent reduction thereafter. A Second Career Savings Plan was
created for teams to match individual player contributions to the fund with a maximum
value of $25,000.62 All players, including those in their first-year, may contribute to the
plan. However, a player must have at least two credited seasons, with at least one season
in 2006 or later, to receive a matching contribution from a team. So, a player who retired in
2005 or before did not receive matching funds. Those who participated in the plan and
played in 2006 received retroactive payments to compensate for a team’s matching
contribution between 1993 and 2006.
A severance pay system was established in the 1982 CBA giving players $5,000 for
every credited season in the league, regardless of vested circumstances. The 1993 CBA
required a minimum of two credited seasons, with at least one season occurring prior to
1993. A player received $10,000 for every credited season as a lump sum payment once he
formally requested severance pay and gave notice of permanently ending employment with
league teams.
Total and Permanent Disability Benefit Program (T & P) was created in 1970 to help
active players and vested retired players who were permanently disabled as determined by
the Retirement Board. A player must have an accredited season after 1958 to be eligible.
61
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T & P benefits were payable for a player’s entire life. Before the 1993 CBA, the NFLPA or
players did not have a representative on the Retirement Board, which acted as a ruling
party for all relevant retirement issues and eligibility requirements. After 1993, the NFLPA
and active players were allowed one representative each on the Retirement Board to
oversee and rule on the cases.63
A Tuition Reimbursement Program was the final amendment offered to players’
benefits program with the 1993 CBA.64 It reimbursed players who entered the draft before
they completed their college degrees or who wished to obtain a graduate or professional
degree reimbursement for all expenses incurred while attending the school of their choice.
Related expenses were defined as tuition, fees, books, and a small stipend at a maximum
yearly amount of $10,000. Players were eligible for the program if they were on an active
NFL roster while continuing their education and had at least two credited seasons in the
league.
The 1998 extension established an annuity program for retired players with an
initial payment by the league of $25 million dollars.65 The annuity program was a deferred
compensation program that allocated $65,000 for every credited season a vested player
was in the league. The annuity program did not apply to vested players before the 1998
season. The extension also increased the lowest benefit credit offered to a monthly
payment of $80 to $100. The pension eligibility requirement was lowered from five to four
credited seasons in order for players to become vested.66 The lowered qualification did not
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apply to retired players. Finally, the active players’ revenue share allocated to retired
player benefits rose to 15%.67
The 2002 CBA negotiations allowed players with injured reserve seasons prior to
1970 to be counted towards pension eligibility. This change caused a 4% increase in the
number of seasons claimed by players in the pension program and allowed over 300
retired players to become vested (Halchin 2008). A majority of those players had not
received vested interest because the injured reserve seasons had left them short of the
necessitated quota. The lowest benefit credits rose again from $100 to $200. The
extension created a health reimbursement account (HRA).68 The HRA was an annual
contribution by the League of $25,000 or $50,000 depending on a player’s eligibility, to
reimburse a player for healthcare expenses during time periods when he is not covered in a
CBA. The reimbursement to an individual player is capped at $300,000. At least eight
credited seasons was required for players whose last credited season was 2005 or before
to receive $25,000. Players in 2006 or later needed at least 3 credited seasons to receive
$50,000. The Tuition Reimbursement Program’s maximum yearly amount was raised to
$15,000. As a final measure, the 2002 extension raised the severance payout to $15,000 for
each credited season in the league.69 The $15,000 was applied only to seasons after 2002,
so a player whose career spanned from 1999 to 2005 would receive $10,000 for the three
seasons before 2002 and $15,000 for the 4 seasons after it.
The 2006 extension raised the lowest benefit credits for a third time to $250, but
only for players vested in the league between 1920 and 1982. The current players, and any
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vested players after 1983, received a 10% increase in their monthly pensions.70 The
extension also tripled widows’ and surviving minor children’s benefits for all retired and
current players. By far, the most significant amendment came in the form of the Plan 88
program created by the league. Plan 88 provides retired players with up to $88,000 per
year for medical care resulting from dementia or other head trauma.71 Funding for
dementia research is also provided by the league at no expense to players. Plan 88
established a network of medical specialists who focused on neurological care, spine
treatment, joint replacements, and discount prescription drugs. The plan doubled the T &
P disability benefit to $40,000 and reduced the periodic reviews to once every five years.72
Finally, the extension substantially increased a vested players’ line of duty benefits
eligibility.73 Eligibility to apply for benefits became correlated with the number of credited
seasons a player was in the League. Instead of only 48 months to apply for benefits, a
player who accrued eight seasons in the NFL would have eight years to apply for line of
duty benefits.
It is estimated that the NFL paid approximately $919.6 million dollars for retired
player benefits in 2007 (Forbes). The NFLPA claimed that active players provided $181.6
million of this amount under the revenue share system.74 The NFLPA noted that only 38
percent of vested retired players were receiving monthly benefits in 2007. The escalating
players’ benefit costs were one reason owners opted out in 2008, especially with NFLPA
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2006 CBA Article XLVII, Section 2(a).
Between 2006-2008 over $9 million dollars was paid to retired players under Plan 88 (Halchin, 2008).
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Id. Article XLVIII-D, Section 2(c).
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Line of duty benefits apply to any player who incurred a substantial disablement due to participation in the NFL,
but is not totally or permanently disabled. A player does not have to be vested to receive benefit payments.
Benefits are paid for no longer than 7 ½ years.
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Staff, 2011. “FACT CHECK: DeMaurice Smith at the University of Virginia Darden School of Business.” NFL Labor
News, April 5, 2011. Retrieved May 3, 2011 (http://nfllabor.com/2011/04/05/fact-check-demaurice-smith-at-theuniversity-of-virginia%E2%80%99s-darden-school-of-business/).
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demands for more league contributions without it affecting the current players’ revenue
share.

Job Security
For most NFL players, job security is associated with guaranteed contracts. Unlike
other sports leagues, the NFL does not offer many guaranteed compensation contracts for
players because of the brutal nature of the sport and the unpredictability of players’
injuries. During the course of the collective bargaining period between 1993 and 2008, an
NFL team’s roster showed that 10 percent of all players at any given time were listed on the
injured reserve list (Leeds and Allmen, 2005). This means that 10 percent of all players on
a team’s active roster at the beginning of a season sustained injuries that left them unable
to finish the season. The 1993 CBA did not change this arrangement and only 6 percent of
all NFL players received guaranteed salary contracts (Vrooman, 2011). The ratio remained
relatively constant during the course of the collective bargaining period, with guaranteed
contracts going to players with league minimum salaries or practice squad players.
Guaranteed salary in the NFL is awarded to players through a bonus payment
system that is associated with contract signings, performance, or participation in team
activities like off-season workouts. It became common practice after the 1993 CBA for
players to receive guaranteed bonuses for participating in team activities. The amounts of
compensation were variable to the number of seasons in the league and a player’s position.
Performance bonuses were integrated as a common practice with the 1998 CBA extension
but remained variable to each individual player’s contract.75

75

1998 CBA Article XXXI, Section 3(b).
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The NFLPA has stated that signing bonuses are preferred over salary guarantees
because the money is given in an upfront lump sum payout before a player offers his
services to a team. Bonuses are a form of players protection in case they receive a careerending injury. Over 60 percent of players during the bargaining period received signing
bonuses of $250,000 or less (Halchin 2008). Marquee players received higher signing
bonuses. The percentage of players who received a signing bonus in 1987 was 23 percent.
In 1993, 40 percent of players received signing bonuses in conjunction with their contracts.
The NFLPA and player agents successfully negotiated more frequent and larger signing
bonuses as a condition for their players in each extension up to 2002 (Halchin 2008). As a
result, in 2001, 82 percent of players received a signing bonus with their contracts. A
majority of minimum salaried players and practice squad players did not receive signing
bonuses.
In 2002, the owners negotiated terms that discouraged the policy of signing bonuses
due to the rising number of players who were suspended from the League and unable to
contribute to the team. Though no implicit standard had ever been officially negotiated
into a CBA concerning signing bonuses, the practice had become an unwritten rule
encouraged by the NFLPA after 1993. Owners began to limit the number of signing
bonuses offered in player contracts resulting in a steady decline over the following years,
which culminated in only 55 percent of players receiving a signing bonus by 2008.

Impartial Dispute Resolution
The 1993 White Settlement Agreement and CBA granted the players a third party
mediator concerning labor dispute issues. Judge Doty mediated and reserved final
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approval over all amendments to the agreements. However, his jurisdiction in the NFL
labor market ended with overseeing amendments to the CBA and did not cover the league’s
disciplining of player conduct or appeals. The Commissioner’s Office maintained
jurisdiction in these matters and did not change during the collective bargaining period.
There are three exceptions. First, the 1993 CBA gave the NFLPA and one player full
representation on the Retirement Board.76 The other exceptions arose in the 2006
bargaining sessions. As already discussed, the NFLPA was allowed to participate in the
league’s television contract negotiations as a condition of the 2006 CBA.77 The third
exception applied to NFLPA representation of the “on the field” rules change process. Each
year, NFL owners hold a weeklong “State of the League” conference to discuss economics
and vote on relevant league issues, like rule changes, for an upcoming season.78 Before
2006, the NFLPA had been excluded from these meetings. The NFLPA was only allowed
access to the meetings on days when rule changes were being discussed.
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1993 CBA Article XXXVII-G, Section 2(c)(ii).
2006 CBA Article XIII, Section 6(e)(iv).
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Id. Article XIII, Section 6(g)(ii).
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
Negotiation Context
The set of relevant U.S. labor laws appears to have the most influence on the
negotiations between the NFL owners and players. All of the NFL’s teams reside and
operate under the jurisdiction of the United States and are accountable to how the laws
define negotiations, the bargaining interactions, and legal courses of action. The Sherman
Act provided the legal precedent that the players use in antitrust lawsuits against the NFL
and its reserve system. Every lawsuit against the NFL contains some elements that attack
the legality of the draft, standard contract, or restrictions on trade, such as free agent
mobility or the salary cap. The nonstatutory labor exemption and its protections outside
the law impeded the players’ ability to negotiate with the owners or seek a third party’s
intervention. A cultural prerogative in the United States is that owners/managers and
workers in American industries understand their situations better than outside arbitrators
and should pursue collective bargaining to settle disputes regardless of power imbalances
between the opponents. Historically, the players were at an extreme disadvantage
compared to the owners because of the reserve system and the owners’ ability to avoid
fully negotiating the players’ demands.
The NFL isn’t as susceptible to the business cycle the way other industries are
affected. Due to its strategic revenue share program and popularity with fans, the NFL has
continued to increase its relative market share and revenue streams. The current recession
has slowed growth, but owners’ net operational income continues to be healthy and secure.
The largest effects the economy has on the NFL are the monies that media outlets,
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corporate sponsors, and fans can spend on NFL interests. The media outlets and corporate
sponsors have remained constant and continue to grow for the NFL, despite the decline in
other industries. In many ways, the NFL controls the media outlets because of the
excessive amounts of money exchanged in the contracts. The media outlets—which
depend on NFL “content”—must market the league sufficiently to reap a return on their
own investments. The state of the overall U.S. economy, though influential in the decisionmaking of league officials, does not seem to impinge on the NFL labor market despite
owners’ claims to the contrary.
Though the NFL and NFLPA are experienced and familiar with the industry’s
negotiation process, they do not approach it with equal experience. Players enter and leave
the league each season due to the draft, retirement, and injuries. As mentioned, players
have short career lifespans. As consequence, the NFLPA represents a different group of
players during each bargaining session. The owners’ membership is more static; almost all
owners acting in the 2011 bargaining sessions will have participated in early NFL
negotiations.79 The team owners are middle-aged businessmen, competent in the language,
tactics, and implications associated of each bargaining action. The players, by comparison,
lack experience. They are mostly young, fresh out of college, not from the same social class
as owners, and often focus more on developing their playing abilities than their business
acumen. Players’ decisions can be influenced by the union, veteran and retired players,
their agents, and the media. The NFL and NFLPA share similar bargaining experience, but
the owners are seasoned veterans compared to the relative rookie status of players.

79

Only four NFL team franchises have changed ownership since 1990. Dan Snyder purchased the Washington
Redskins in 1999 and three new franchises were created: Carolina Panthers and Jacksonville Jaguars in 1993 and
the new Cleveland Browns in 1999.
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Consequently, the owners have dominated the labor relationship because they benefit from
the reserve system and the strategic disadvantages of the players’ limited resources,
experience, and time.
Under the collective bargaining arrangement, the NFLPA struggled to undermine the
anti-competitive nature of the reserve system and the NFL’s monopoly power over
professional football in the U.S. The players had few alternatives other than decertifying in
1989. Decertification made the NFL adhere to the larger social order of the United States’s
legal system, whose jurisdiction outranked the NFL and exposed the reserve system to a
level of authority beyond the owners’ control. The lawsuits of the 1970s and the
decertified action of 1989 represent two significant periods in the NFL’s negotiated order
when the players were able to achieve some of their goals. Until 1993, the players could
not bypass the nonstatutory labor exemption’s legal protection of the owners from
antitrust scrutiny. Once the barrier was removed, the owners became eager to reach an
agreement and insisted upon a return to the collective bargaining arrangements. However,
the 1989 decertification and the White ruling changed the status quo from a monopsony
empowered elite group of owners to a more egalitarian relationship based on organic
solidarity and reciprocity. The data demonstrate that each side benefited from the new
free agent/salary cap arrangement, maximizing profits for all.
The main interests of the owners and players have not changed since the bargaining
relationship began in 1970. Each negotiation period is routinized by the same issues,
actions, and representatives (NFL and NFLPA), with minimal variation over time. The
negotiations are connected by the nature of the collective bargaining process. Each time a
CBA expires, the bargaining parties have the chance to renegotiate the conditional
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arrangements. The time between NFL bargaining sessions was variable, but recurs
approximately every 5 years (1968, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1993, etc.). Typically, the
concessions received by players in a previous CBA remain valid in a new CBA, but
unresolved conflicts become objects of interest for future negotiations and can escalate into
tensions, mistrust, bitterness, and a lack of cooperation between the groups. Each CBA
symbolically represents a temporal peace for the duration of the agreement.
The NFL owners need CBAs for more reasons than sheer market power.
Professional football before the NFL consisted of loosely banded teams that had no interteam affiliations. It was impossible to create a sustainable product because team owners
did not know which teams would be available to schedule games with the following year.
The same type of problems would surface in the present-day NFL without binding
collective agreements. For example, if the Dallas Cowboys acted purely in its own selfinterest, it would play a 20-game national schedule to maximize its profit potential, while
the Cincinnati Bengals would perhaps play only 12 regional games because it is more cost
efficient in its market. The league would have no national media contracts or licensing
agreements because each team would negotiate its own contracts for presumably less
money than a collective could obtain. Large market teams would dominate the industry,
possibly resulting in a diminished league with only a few national-interest teams. The
CBAs bring together the players and owners into a single group with shared interests and
goals.
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Findings Analysis
The findings suggest that there is only partial support for the success of
decertification to improve the four key variables I measured. The overall pattern I found is
that the strategy of decertification/litigation was effective in securing a major change in
players’ status – ‘free agency’ – and improving player mobility. The other three variables
were more weakly affected.
Free agency remained the most consistent need for players from the beginning of
the NFL’s labor market negotiations. The findings show that decertified litigation enhanced
the players’ mobility far more than collective bargaining could have produced between
1987-1993; or improvements achieved between 1994-2008 were minor by comparison.
Without the decertified action, it is realistic to infer that players would not have achieved
unrestricted free agency because it was a concession the owners continue to deny in
collective bargaining.
The court mediated rulings altered the players’ core status in the bargaining
relationship. All three lawsuits attacked the legality of the restrictions placed by owners on
players’ mobility. The victory in McNeil was a culmination of over 50 years of organized
negotiations with owners over unrestricted free agency. In the NFL, all binding issues and
rules must be incorporated into a CBA before they become operational. The court can
declare one of the owners’ anti-competitive behaviors to be in violation of the Sherman Act,
but it remains abstract and external to the league’s operations until it’s bargained into an
agreement. White would have failed to grant free agency to players without the settlement
agreement and associated 1993 CBA. This illustrates how a cycle of decertified litigation
followed by collective bargaining functions far better than each strategy alone.
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Consequently, the players’ use of litigation, though successful in 1993 for obtaining
free agency, may not be an effective strategy for other negotiation situations. If an
organization such as the NFL refuses to adopt litigated policies into its structures, then the
court rulings have little effect on the actual operations and work conditions of those
entities. A successful third party intervention occurs only when recommendations are
incorporated into the structures and practices of the organization and become part of the
structural context. Despite winning the court cases in the 1970s, it took the players more
than 25 years before those conditions were accepted into the NFL’s negotiated order. This
is one of the biggest problems associated with alternative modes of action such as
decertification because the social order does not change until the structures surrounding
the traditional arrangements also change.
The two most commonly cited litigation interests for players besides free agency are
the reserve system’s influence on the draft and the standard players’ contract. These two
restrictive measures will not disappear in the manner that brought free agency. Neither
the owners nor players will relinquish the draft as a condition shaping the labor market.
The owners have staged the draft as a celebratory and ritualized spectacle that future
players anticipate eagerly as their debut into the league. Before the 2011 Draft, the NFLPA
asked collegiate players to boycott the Draft because of the current lockout, but the players
refused. Every player alluded to the desire to walk across the stage, shake the
commissioner’s hand, put on his new jersey, and listen to the fans cheer for his draft
selection. The draft has become meaningful to the players and their families as the day
their childhood dreams come true.
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The standard players’ contract, despite its questionable nature, is a necessary evil
for the NFL to ensure that all players adhere to the same binding agreements and
membership rights in the league. Amendments may be made to the standard players’
contract, but it seems unrealistic that dramatic changes will occur. The NFL and NFLPA
will eventually agree to a new CBA and these terms will be codified in that agreement
because both parties support and/or accept those practices.
A primary function of the standard players’ contract is the players’
acknowledgement of the commissioner’s role as judge and jury over league matters.
Decertification did not improve the status quo arrangement for players, nor did collective
bargaining. Judge Doty and the Minnesota District Court did assume jurisdiction over the
amendments to the 1993 White Settlement Agreement and CBA, but this oversight was not
permanent nor encompassing. No formal impartial system was established under the
litigation strategy. Collective bargaining granted NFLPA representation on the rules
committee, but this was a minor change. The commissioner maintained the right to veto
contracts and to manage behaviors, discipline players, and resolve disputes. The players
still lack an impartial mechanism to appeal the commissioner’s rulings or seek a third
party’s intervention on any matter stipulated in a CBA and/or players’ contract.
Similarly, the research demonstrates that neither decertification nor collective
bargaining improved players’ job security. Due to the relevant nature of the game of
football, NFL players have an average career life-span of 3.8 seasons. Their “playing days”
can be cut short due to injury or declining skill, so maximizing compensation during
players’ tenures in the NFL is a major concern. Decertification allowed veteran players to
seek better compensation with more mobility, but this is not security because many
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players will never realize the four-year minimum requirement to become a free agent.
Collective bargaining helped players’ job security by initially increasing the guaranteed
signing bonuses paid to players as a condition of their contracts from 40 percent of all
peoples in 1993 to 82 percent in 2002. However, in the second half of the bargaining
period, this trend reversed and by 2008, the percent of players receiving guaranteed
bonuses was only 55 percent. It’s fair to say that the drop in the percentage of players
receiving bonuses was a retrenchment by owners to offset risk. Either way, players’ job
security remained conditional and players did not receive guaranteed contracts or
compensation other than the bonus payment structure, which was highly variable during
the time-frame of the study.
The main bargaining interest in the 2011 negotiations concerns the players’
percentage of revenue share. It can be argued that players received a higher percentage of
league revenue through decertification than collective bargaining, but the findings are far
from definitive. Revenue share, like most labor market issues, is handled through collective
bargaining rather than the courts. Courts can assess and award damages and impose
injunctions against bargaining actions but cannot dictate the exact distribution of revenue
to either party.
Revenue sharing varied considerably in the research and had many mediating
factors such as the leagues’ projected income, television contracts, licensing agreements,
and fan attendance. Comparing the standards in 1986 with 1993, we notice a dramatic
change in the players’ share of league revenue during decertification. The revenue share
rose from 49 to 68.5 percent, but these numbers may prove misleading because 1993 was
an uncapped year. An interesting finding is that before 1989 the NFLPA continuously failed
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to secure a 55 percent revenue share for players. After the 1993 CBA, the players’ revenue
share did not decrease below 55 percent. The closest it came to falling below this
threshold was in 1999 with 55.9 percent. The rise in salaries remained fixed under the
salary cap and tied to the increased revenue generated by the NFL.
Collective bargaining provided the players with increases in revenue share in 2002
and 2006. The 2002 agreement was the only time that players’ revenue share remained
above 60 percent for the course of the agreement. The restructuring of the 2006 CBA
reduced the players’ percentage but increased the monies allocated to player salaries
under the salary cap. These changes were not as substantial as those made between 1986
and 1993, nor as consistent over as long a duration. The 2002 agreement lasted four
seasons and the 2006 agreement lasted only three, until the owners opted out of the CBA to
renegotiate the labor arrangements.

Conclusion
Decertification alone did not produce major changes to the status quo other than
player mobility because modern labor markets require formal structures and policies. The
NFL operates like a cartel and needs to bind all of its members into a single association of
functioning parts. This is one reason the owners insisted that the NFLPA be recertified as a
condition of the White settlement, as a way to reorganize the players’ new status as
potential free agents into a new CBA. Without CBAs as an organizational mechanism, the
NFL would struggle to maintain its groupthink mentality and operational capacity.
My analysis shows that decertification and collective bargaining are not opposing
strategies; one sets the stage for the other. The eventual outcome of litigation within the
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NFL labor market will be a return to a two-party bargaining relation. Decertification
functions as a sequential rather than alternative strategy that players may deploy in
negotiations. As a sequential strategy, decertified litigation helps a significant status
change for the players in the labor market but cannot finesse within-status reforms. The
latter is reserved for collective bargaining within the context of the negotiated order and
the larger, prevailing social order. Decertification helped to create free agency, but CBAs
are the most likely mechanisms for changes until another fundamental status change is or
may be sought.
Decertification realized free agency for NFL players in less than five years based on
the antitrust statues of the United States, but it was an evolved process. The 1970s NFL
players did not capitalize on free agency with Mackey because of their inexperience in
converting litigated victories into status quo agreements. The players in 1993 learned
from their predecessors and immediately followed the McNeil verdict with a class action
lawsuit to bind the ruling into a formal agreement, which it accomplished in White. The
status-altering shift earned by players in the settlement greatly increased players’ mobility
and relative revenue share, but only when conjoined with the owners’ interests and
acceptance of a salary cap.
The White victory offered the players more than mobility; it created a partnership
between owners and players who both now share in the league’s success. As the research
suggests, this partnership would not have been possible without the players’ decertified
action and the court’s intervention. Such abrupt changes seem less feasible through
traditional arrangements like collective bargaining because the operative functions of an
organization constrain the participating members’ actions. Status-altering shifts seem
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more probable under a decertification/litigation model because it operates outside the
status quo and demands the intervention of a third party. This action does not guarantee
success, but it permits the reinterpretation of the social order’s formal structures by an
impartial mediator, which within-status bargaining relations rarely accomplish. Collective
bargaining supports negotiations over the NFL’s operative structures that influence
revenue share, job security, and impartial mediation but does not produce dramatic
changes of the formal structures. Only litigation realized this goal for the players as free
agency forced the owners to compete for available players’ talent, acknowledge the players’
discretionary needs, and increase the players’ bargaining positions relative to the owners.
The players’ status change – the 1993 CBA’s concession of free agency – completely altered
the status quo arrangements of the labor market and is the most significant improvement
the players have realized within the NFL’s negotiated order.
The NFL’s negotiated order is a continuous process with temporal limits that must
be reevaluated periodically over time and sometimes dramatically altered. It will be
interesting to see how the organizational structures of the NFL change as a reaction to the
current conflict between the owners and players. Most likely the broad standards that
oversee the general operations of the NFL will not change as they did in 1993 with free
agency. The players and owners now share the responsibility of maintaining the league’s
competitive balance and profitability. The owners will continue to seek new ways to limit
effective actions of players in negotiations. The players will seek more concessions.
Regardless, the present conditions of the NFL’s negotiated order pose too great a risk for
either party to detour too far off course.
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